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ABSTRACT  
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are a key policy measure used by U.S. states to increase 
their production of renewable electricity. Economic theory shows that RPSs are not first-best 
policy measures for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions or solving other environmental 
problems. Nevertheless, they have been politically popular, in part because states hope they will 
help create new jobs in what they expect will be a growth industry. Research suggests that RPSs 
tend to be supported by Democratic legislatures in states with good solar and wind potential, are 
more likely in states with restructured electricity markets, and are less likely in states heavily 
dependent upon natural gas for electricity generation. Research also suggests RPSs have been 
successful at increasing renewable generation capacity, have increased the cost of electricity 
modestly where they have been implemented, and reduce carbon emissions at a cost roughly 
consistent with estimates of the social cost of carbon. 
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1. Introduction 
The mid 2000s witnessed widespread adoption by U.S. state governments of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPSs) as a policy tool for promoting renewable electricity generation. An 
RPS ensures that a minimum amount of renewable energy (for example, wind, solar, biomass, 
and geothermal energy) is included in the state’s portfolio of electric generating resources, and – 
by increasing the required amount over time – the RPS can put the electricity industry on a path 
toward increasing sustainability.  
This new policy tool has been initiated by state governments in the absence of guiding federal 
regulations. The first RPS dates back to 1983, when Iowa passed the Alternative Energy 
Production law (revised in 1991 and 2000) requiring its two investor-owned utilities – Mid-
American and Interstate Power and Light – to contract for a combined total of 105 megawatts 
(MW) of generation from renewable energy resources. The policy became increasingly popular 
in the late 1990s, and another burst of policy adoption occurred in the mid-2000s, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. By June 2015, 29 states and the District of Columbia had created mandatory RPS 
programs, and eight other states had voluntary renewable energy goals, as shown in Figure 2. 
Although state RPS policies are now the principal form of support for renewable energy projects 
in the U.S., scholars have questioned the effectiveness and the efficiency of this policy in 
reducing sulfur and carbon emissions. Simulation models suggest that an RPS is not the first-best 
policy for achieving environmental improvements (Palmer and Burtraw 2005, Fischer and 
Newell 2008). Politically, an active movement to repeal or roll back RPS requirements has 
emerged, with Ohio having already “frozen” its RPS and West Virginia having repealed its 
(already weak) one. 
The U.S. is not the only country to have introduced policies stipulating quantities of renewable 
electricity development. The European Union passed the Directive on Electricity Production 
from Renewable Energy Sources in 2001 and expanded it in 2007 with more aggressive targets. 
Various countries have adopted different approaches to implementing the requirements, some of 
which resemble RPS policies (Menanteau et al., 2003). In addition, in 1997 Japan set a 2012 
target of 118 million KWh from renewable energy, roughly 1.35% of total generation (Nishio et 
al., 2006). However, the U.S. is arguably the nation that has made the most use of this policy 
instrument. 
Given the academic and political debates around RPS policies, this is a propitious time to review 
what is known about them and their economic and environmental impacts. The next section 
reviews what economic theory has to say about the impacts of RPSs, and Section 3 discusses the 
history of RPS policies, with an emphasis on their goals and political motivations. Section 4 then 
surveys the empirical literature on the impacts of RPSs in practice. Section 5 explores the 
emerging political opposition to RPSs and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of needs for 
future research. 
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2. Economic Analysis of RPS Policies 
Textbook economic responses to environmental externalities typically involve Pigouvian taxes 
that “internalize” through prices the harms business transactions would otherwise impose on 
third parties. In many countries, particularly in Europe, a price-based mechanism referred to as a 
“feed-in tariff” (FIT) is used to support renewable energy generation. A FIT guarantees a fixed 
price to generators of renewable electricity, thereby reducing business risks to investors but 
potentially shifting them to consumers (Schmalensee, 2012). To the extent that the FIT is above 
the price paid to other generators, it can be seen as a Pigouvian subsidy rewarding renewable 
generators for their lower emissions relative to fossil-fuel generation. 
When abatement costs are uncertain, an emission tax (or a renewables subsidy) cannot guarantee 
any specific level of abatement, and a quantity constraint on emissions may be more efficient 
than a tax (Weitzman, 1974). A system of tradable emission permits (a “cap and trade” system) 
combines some of the desirable features of both taxes and quantity limits, as it provides certainty 
of emission reductions while allowing the burden of abatement to be allocated efficiently by 
market forces, so that the marginal cost of abatement is equalized across emitters (Sterner, 2003). 
2.1 The Design of RPSs 
An RPS is a quantity-based policy instrument. Some states, such as Iowa and Texas, frame their 
RPS requirements in terms of a specified number of megawatts of capacity. More commonly, 
however, an RPS requires that a certain percentage of power generated must come from 
renewable sources. It is thus a “ratio-based” policy, similar to the Renewable Fuel Standard for 
vehicles.  
Implementation is normally accomplished by granting Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) to 
generators of renewable power, and requiring load-serving entities to surrender enough RECs to 
cover the requisite amount of renewable generation. Regulated entities that fail to surrender 
enough RECS must make an Alternative Compliance Payment (ACP), a penalty which serves as 
an enforcement mechanism. Average ACPs are around $50/MWh, but some are as low as 
$10/MWh. Thus, the level of compliance with the requirements is likely to vary across states, 
too. 
Many states impose additional restrictions, “carving out” certain amounts of power that must 
come from specific sources (usually solar), or offering additional credit for favored categories. 
These provisions may be intended to help support a nascent solar installation industry in a 
particular state, or to bolster an emerging solar manufacturing industry (if the RPS also requires 
that renewable generators must be purchased from within the state). However, these provisions 
also raise the cost of meeting RPS goals, since they ensure that the marginal cost of generation 
will not be equalized across all generation sources. 
In principle, an RPS that allows unrestricted REC trading is very similar to a cap-and-trade 
system. In practice, however, most states restrict REC trading, e.g. by requiring that renewable 
generation come from in-state sources. As a result, the marginal cost of renewable generation is 
not equalized across sources or across states, and efficiency in encouraging renewable generation 
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is vitiated. For example, in August of 2010 prices for solar RECs in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Delaware and Ohio were over $300/MWh, while unrestricted RECs in many other 
states were below $35/MWh (Schmalensee, 2012). These vast differences in REC prices show 
that the marginal cost of renewable power varies wildly across states and across generation 
types, and hence RPS policies cannot be minimizing the costs of increasing renewable 
generation. 
Another design choice made by policymakers when creating an RPS is whether to allow 
“banking” of RECs over time. Banking encourages early adoption of renewable generation 
sources, and reduces the risks to investors worried about future changes in the economics of 
renewables. Unfortunately, most states place significant constraints on the banking of RECs, 
further reducing the cost effectiveness of RPS policies (Schmalensee, 2012). 
2.2 Economic Efficiency of RPSs 
Consistent with the foregoing comments, formal economic analysis shows that an RPS is not a 
first-best policy for reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs), even in its most flexible form. Palmer 
and Burtraw (2005) find that an RPS tends to displace natural gas as a generating fuel rather than 
coal, and thus is less effective at reducing carbon emissions than a direct tax on carbon 
emissions. They also find the economic cost of the RPS is relatively low at levels up to 15% 
penetration of the electricity grid, but that it rises sharply for penetration targets of 20% and 
above. Similarly, Fischer and Newell (2008) find that an RPS is substantially less efficient than 
alternative policies such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system. Their method is to examine 
alternative policies that will lead to an equivalent amount of GHG emissions, and compare their 
costs. They find that a carbon tax has the lowest economic costs, and that an RPS is twice as 
costly as a carbon tax.
1
  
The general direction of these economic conclusions is perhaps not completely surprising. Other 
papers have also shown that ratio-based policies tend to induce economic distortions. Indeed, 
over 50 years ago Averch and Johnson (1962) showed that economic regulation via a rate-of-
return constraint leads regulated firms to overinvest in capital relative to labor. Similarly, a low-
carbon fuel standard (which mandates a percentage of transportation fuel much come from low-
carbon sources) induces increased use of low-carbon fuel, and results in unnecessarily high costs 
of abatement, (Holland et al., 2009). Even if the direction of the distortions identified by Palmer 
and Burtraw (2005) and Fischer and Newell (2008) is not surprising, however, their magnitude is 
large enough to be disconcerting.
2
  
                                                          
1
 Menanteau et al. (2003) compare the efficiency of incentive schemes in several different European countries and 
argue that feed-in-tariffs are more efficient than RPS requirements.  
2 Interestingly, Fischer (2010) shows that an RPS can potentially reduce electricity prices. The mechanism is that the 
RPS reduces demand for natural-gas fired generation, and hence can lead to a reduction in the cost of natural gas. If 
gas is the fuel at the margin, and electricity prices are set based on marginal cost, it is possible for the reduction in 
natural gas prices to produce a drop in electricity prices as well.  
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An additional concern about RPS policies is that they need to be carefully coordinated with other 
emissions policies if they are to be effective in reducing pollution. In regions with a carbon tax, 
such as California or the northeast states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), an 
RPS may have no impact on overall carbon emissions, because other emissions sources not 
subject to the RPS can profit by increasing their emissions without violating the overall cap 
(Moore et al., 2010). 
3. The History and Politics of RPSs 
Rabe (2004) was one of the first authors to recognize the importance of state RPS policies as a 
response to concerns about climate change. He studies a sample of states from around the United 
States that have adopted RPSs, and seeks to understand the political forces that led to their 
adoption. Among the most important factors mentioned by state policymakers in support of an 
RPS is that the policy creates jobs in a growth sector of the economy, so states with high 
unemployment rates might be expected to be especially like to adopt an RPS. “In all of the cases 
presented in this book, economic development has been a contributing – and, in some instances, 
dominating – factor behind state greenhouse gas reduction policy.” (Rabe, p. 29). Because Rabe 
focuses on a set of case studies, however, he is not able to test such hypotheses with statistical 
confidence. 
An RPS is not a first-best policy, but RPS policies are one of the most politically popular forms 
of support for renewable energy in the U.S. Thus, it is important to understand what political, 
social and economic factors explain state adoption of RPSs. Furthermore, measurement of the 
impact of RPS policies needs to take into account the factors that drove adoption, to control for 
the possibility that the states choosing to adopt an RPS would have achieved the same outcomes 
even without an RPS. There have been a number of papers that attempt to measure empirically 
the relative importance of various drivers of RPS adoption at the state level.  
Several papers use a simple cross-sectional logit model to estimate the probability that a state has 
an RPS policy in place in a given year. Vachon and Menz (2006) conduct such an analysis for 
the U.S. in the year 2005, and find that composite measures of social and political interests were 
positively linked to the adoption of an RPS, while renewable potential (measured as the percent 
of sales that can be provided from renewable resources) was not significant. Huang et al. (2007) 
conduct a similar cross-sectional analysis for the year 2005, and find that states with higher gross 
state product, higher population growth, and higher levels of educational attainment were more 
likely to adopt an RPS, while states with a majority of Republicans in the legislature and with 
higher expenditures on natural resources were less likely to adopt.  
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) take a similar approach, but they use all years from find that 
an RPS is more likely in states with greater solar and wind potential, a higher fraction of 
Democratic state representatives, more environmentally-oriented federal Congressional 
representatives, the presence of a chapter of the American Solar Energy Society, a higher 
percentage of power from renewable sources, higher emissions (of SOx, NOX, and CO2), higher 
average income, and lower unemployment rates.  
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The static cross-sectional logit approach can be criticized because it treats each yearly 
observation for a state as independent of previous years’ policy. In reality, however, once an RPS 
policy is introduced it tends to be in place for multiple years, which means that an estimation 
approach with lagged dependent variables would be more appropriate. A failure to account for 
the intertemporal correlation of policy choices overstates the precision of empirical estimates, 
and can also bias coefficient estimates. Thus, most recent papers take a different econometric 
approach, borrowed from the technology adoption literature. These papers use a hazard rate 
model that takes into account which states are earlier or later adopters of RPS policy. This 
approach removes the state from the sample once it has adopted an RPS, thereby avoiding the 
problem of intertemporal correlation. (This approach is sometimes termed the “event history 
approach” in the political science literature.) Chandler (2009) takes such an approach for the 
period 1997-2008. She finds that early adoption of an RPS was more likely when a state had 
higher personal income and more liberal political ideology, as well as when neighboring states or 
other states in the same region had already adopted RPS policies.  
Lyon and Yin (2010) use a hazard rate specification 1994-2007, but use a broader spectrum of 
variables. They consider three possible explanations for adoption: 1) public interest welfare 
maximization, 2) political ideology, and 3) political pressure from special interest groups. The 
results provide some support for each of these factors. Consistent with the public interest, states 
with greater wind and solar potential are more likely to adopt RPSs. However, contrary to the 
claims that RPSs create more jobs, states with low unemployment rates were more likely to 
adopt RPSs. Political ideology turned out to be the most important driver of early RPS adoption: 
state legislatures dominated by Democrats were much more likely to support an RPS than are 
Republicans. Finally, special interest pressure matters as well: states with organized 
representation of renewable energy interest groups were more likely to adopt RPSs. Lyon and 
Yin (2010) also examine the determinants of in-state requirements in RPSs, and find these are 
more likely in states that had less renewable generation at the time the RPS was passed, and in 
states with restructured electricity markets.  
Carley and Miller (2012) seek to determine whether the factors driving the adoption of “strong” 
RPSs (more stringent than the median state that already had an RPS) differ from those driving 
“weak” RPSs (less stringent than the median state). They measure stringency as the increase in 
percentage of renewables required by the RPS divided by the number of years to achieve it, all 
multiplied by the share of total generation covered. They find that state-level citizen political 
ideology (as measured by Americans for Democratic Action scores) is a significant predictor of 
weak RPS policy adoption. In contrast, “strong” policy designs are best predicted by ideology at 
the government level (as proxied by the so-called DW-Nominate scores). 
Fowler and Breen (2013) argue that political culture affects RPS adoption, and find that states 
with “moralist” cultures (emphasizing the common good) are the most likely to adopt an RPS, 
followed by states with “individualist” cultures (emphasizing free markets) and lastly by states 
with “traditionalist” cultures (emphasizing elite control and paternalism). Matisoff and Edwards 
(2014) explore the role of interstate policy diffusion in RPS adoption using the event history 
approach. They find that states with large land mass, liberal politics, and worse air quality adopt 
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RPSs earlier. They find no evidence that there is policy diffusion across neighboring states, but 
they do find support for the notion that policies diffuse across states with regional and/or cultural 
similarities. Yi and Feiock (2012) also use an event history approach, and show that states were 
more likely to adopt an RPS if they had already passed supply-side policies (such as tax breaks) 
that support renewable electricity production. 
While not strictly comparable, other studies have examined the propensity of countries in the 
European Union to adopt policies supporting renewable electricity, such as the Directive on 
Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources, passed in 2001 and expanded in 2007 
with more aggressive targets. Jenner et al. (2012) study 27 EU countries for the period 1990 to 
2010, using an approach based on Lyon and Yin (2010). They find that renewables policies were 
adopted earlier in countries with an established chapter of the International Solar Energy 
Association, with a less concentrated electric utility industry, with higher unemployment rates, 
and with higher solar energy potential. Perhaps the most striking difference from U.S. studies is 
that Europeans actually count on renewable policies to create jobs when unemployment is high, 
whereas in the U.S. states with low unemployment rates are more likely to adopt RPS policies. 
In summary, the literature on the drivers of RPS adoption is fairly consistent in its findings. An 
RPS is more likely to be adopted in states with greater wind and solar potential. However, an 
RPS is a highly partisan form of policy that is much more strongly supported by liberal 
Democrats than conservative Republicans. Not surprisingly, special interest group pressure from 
the renewables industry helps drive RPS adoption. In the US, RPS policies are adopted in states 
with low unemployment rates, although in the EU countries adopt renewables policies when 
unemployment is high.  
 
4. Empirical Findings on the Impacts of RPSs 
The literature on the impacts of RPSs has focused on three main questions. First, to what extent 
does an RPS actually lead to an increase in renewable energy development? Second, to what 
extent does an RPS lead to an increase in electricity prices? Third, what are the environmental 
impacts of RPS policies? The literature on the consequences of RPS policies has proven to be 
more contentious than the literature on the causes of RPS policies. This is in part because some 
papers have used simplistic measures of RPS stringency. It may also be due in part to the fact 
that most studies on the impact of RPSs have not accounted for the endogeneity of state 
decisions to adopt RPSs in the first place. This is an issue to which we will return at the end of 
the section.  
 
4.1 Renewable Energy Development 
One might think it odd to question whether a policy designed to support renewable energy 
development supports renewable energy development. However, some states provide very weak 
penalties to utilities that fail to meet RPS requirements, so compliance may be poor. In addition, 
states may pass RPS requirements that they are already on track to meet or in fact have already 
8 
 
met.
3
 For example, Maine passed an RPS in 1999 requiring that 30% of power come from 
renewable sources, including hydroelectric sources, but its percentage of renewable power at the 
time the law was implemented was actually higher than 30% (Yin and Powers, 2010). Thus, the 
question of whether an RPS actually brings forth more renewable investment than would have 
happened anyway is an interesting one. Indeed, some authors, such as Michaels (2007) and 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) argue that RPS policies are largely symbolic, and have no 
real impact on renewables deployment. 
Most empirical studies find that RPS policies are positively correlated with renewable energy 
investment. Carley (2009) finds that a dummy variable for presence of an RPS policy has a 
significant and positive effect on total generation from renewable sources but no significant 
effect on the percentage of renewable generation out of the total electricity generation mix.
4
 
Ohler and Radusewicz (2010) focus on the state of Illinois, and argue qualitatively that its RPS 
has encouraged mostly wind generation and has raised awareness of problems with the 
transmission grid. 
Yin and Powers (2010) argue that it is crucial to account for the fact that RPS policies often do 
not cover all utilities in the state, and are often passed by states that have already made 
significant progress towards meeting the stated goals. Thus, they introduce a new measure of 
RPS stringency that accounts for both these factors. (Thus, they treat Maine’s 30% RPS as 
having an incremental stringency of 0%.) It turns out that using the correct measure of stringency 
makes an enormous different in empirical results. Using a simple dummy variable for RPS 
adoption, their panel-data analysis fails to find any impact of RPS adoption on the percentage of 
in-state generating capacity that comes from renewable sources. Using the nominal RPS 
requirement as an independent variable actually suggests that RPS policies have a negative 
impact on the percentage of capacity from renewable sources, as also found by Shrimali and 
Kniefel (2011). However, using their measure of RPS stringency, they find a significant impact 
of RPS passage on in-state renewable electric capacity. Furthermore, when they account for the 
possibility of meeting RPS requirements via the “free trade” of Renewable Energy Certificates 
(RECs), they find an almost 1-for-1 relationship between RPS stringency and deployment. Thus, 
they demonstrate the great importance of using nuanced measures of RPS design. Interestingly, 
they find a substitution effect between RPS requirements and “free trade” of Renewable Energy 
Credits (RECs). That is, allowing RPS requirements to be met through acquisition of RECs from 
other states can significantly weaken the impact of an RPS on in-state renewables investment. 
Thus, the combination of the above two policies should be used with caution.  
Fischlein and Smith (2013) delve further into the heterogeneity in RPS designs, and characterize 
in detail how state RPSs differ. They argue that an RPS will induce a higher share of renewable 
energy generation if it is stringent, has strong penalties for non-compliance, and allows 
flexibility in meeting the goal. They conduct a preliminary empirical test of these hypotheses 
                                                          
3
 For example, Maine passed an RPS in 1999 requiring that 30% of power come from renewable sources, including 
hydroelectric sources. Its percentage of renewable power at the time the law was implemented was actually higher 
than this.  http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/452 . 
4
 She states in a footnote that the results are not changed significantly when using the nominal value of the RPS 
requirement instead of a dummy variable for presence of an RPS. 
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using data from 2008, and including both in-state and out-of-state generation. They find that 
utilities with more demanding goals, voluntary green power programs and/or REC trading have a 
higher share of renewable generation. States with deregulated wholesale markets have a lower 
share of renewable generation, as do states that require in-state generation of renewables. 
Surprisingly, the strength of non-compliance penalties has no significant effect. 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) point out that RPS policies are not adopted in a vacuum, so 
estimation of the impact of these policies may be biased if the political selection process is 
ignored. Indeed, they argue that once the selection process is considered, RPS policies are 
merely symbolic political gestures, and have no impact at all. The authors employ a Heckman-
style two-stage model of RPS impacts, with the first stage estimating the adoption of an RPS, 
and the second stage estimating the impact of the RPS (the presence of an RPS is measured 
simply by a dummy variable). Their first-stage model produces results similar to those of Lyon 
and Yin (2010). States with better wind and solar resources are more likely to adopt an RPS, as 
are states with more liberal (i.e., Democratic) legislatures, states with lower unemployment rates, 
and states with a staffed chapter of the American Solar Energy Society (ASES). Unlike Lyon and 
Yin (2010), however, they find that restructuring had no significant impact on RPS adoption. 
The second-stage of the model uses estimated probabilities of adopting an RPS as an 
independent variable. The authors find that once selection is accounted for, “RPS has proven to 
have a negative effect on investments in renewable capacity.” This is somewhat misleading, 
however, because they find that RPSs have a significant and positive effect for investor-owned 
utilities (IOUs), which account for the largest share of generation; furthermore, some states only 
impose their RPS on IOUs.  
Although the use of a two-stage model is laudable, its implementation suffers from some 
methodological issues that call its findings into question. In the first stage model, the authors run 
a logit estimation of probability of adopting an RPS each year, which appears to assume that the 
RPS is up for reconsideration each year. In reality, however, most states commit to an RPS for a 
period of years, which is exactly what motivates researchers to use a hazard rate approach that 
removes a state from the sample once a policy has been introduced. Another concern is that the 
first-stage model includes the percentage of power from renewable sources, which is an 
endogenous function of prior periods’ RPS policy decisions. This raises the chance that the 
model’s results will be biased, and will understate the impact of the RPS on renewable capacity. 
A similar concern arises in the second-stage model, which includes the percentage of generation 
from renewables as an independent variable, despite the fact that it is endogenously determined 
with capacity additions. Overall, then, while the paper’s findings are provocative, they need to be 
confirmed by other papers using more robust empirical methods before policymakers can rely 
upon them. 
4.2 Electricity Prices 
As demonstrated by Fischer (2009), it is possible for an RPS to either raise or lower electricity 
prices, depending upon the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply of natural gas, 
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among other factors. Thus the impact of RPSs on electricity prices is an important empirical 
question.
5
 
On balance, the empirical literature suggests that electricity prices increase following an RPS 
adoption, but estimates of the magnitude of the effect vary widely. Kydes (2007) uses the 
Department of Energy’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to simulate the impact of a 
20% federal RPS and finds that electricity prices rise about 3% on average as a result. 
Lamontagne (2013) uses panel data regression techniques for the period 1990-2010 to estimate 
the impact of RPS policies in practice, and finds that states with an RPS have approximately a 
20% higher all-retail electricity price than states that do not have an RPS. She also finds that in 
states with an RPS, electricity prices rise 5% per year relative to states with no RPS, rising to 
10% per year after the policy is in place for a decade. These papers only examine state-level 
variation, however, with potentially large utility-level variations left unexplored. Tra (2015) 
investigates the effect of the RPS on residential and commercial electricity rates at the utility 
level for the period 1990-2012. He finds that a dummy variable for presence of a state RPS is 
associated with about a 3% increase in average residential and commercial electricity rates. 
However, he also finds that if RPS stringency is measured by mandated nominal renewables 
share, then RPS stringency has no significant effect on prices once state-by-year fixed effects are 
included in the model.  
An alternative approach to analyzing the effect of an RPS is to develop a detailed simulation 
model that solves the electricity dispatch problem for a specific utility system with and without 
the RPS requirement. Johnson and Novacheck (2015a, b, c) conduct such an analysis for the state 
of Michigan, exploring the cost to consumers of increasing the share of renewables in the 
generation mix from the current 10% to 25%. They find that the average consumer would pay 
$2.60 more per month in the year 2030 as a result of the expanded RPS, an increase of 3% 
(Johnson and Novacheck, 2015a).  
 
4.3 Environmental Impacts  
There has been relatively little attention paid to the environmental impacts of RPS policies, 
perhaps because the measurement challenges are serious.  
Carley (2011) builds a two-state simulation model of electricity dispatch, using the 
AURORAxmp package widely used by regulatory commissions, to simulate policies in Utah and 
Arizona, two neighboring states. She considers a suite of policies including an RPS, a demand-
side management (DSM) program, renewable energy tax incentives, and a carbon capture and 
sequestion (CCS) policy, which makes it difficult to identify the effect of the RPS. She finds that 
isolated state policies raise electricity prices by over 30%, but state coordination can reduce the 
increase to roughly 20% while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions substantially. 
                                                          
5
 Huisman et al. (2013) use the experience with hydropower to argue that an increase in renewable power supply is 
likely to reduce electricity prices, but as the authors acknowledge this evidence is at best indirect. 
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Prasad and Munch (2012) provide a preliminary test for the period 1997-2008 of whether state-
level carbon emissions are lower in states with an RPS or other policies that support renewable 
generation. They find very weak policy effects in general, but that a public benefits fund does 
lead to significant reductions of carbon emissions. In addition, they find that states with an RPS 
that has been in place longer have lower carbon emissions. Unfortunately, they are unable to 
control for inter-state transfers of renewable generation, i.e. through trading of RECs. Future 
work should attempt to take this into account, to update the sample period, and to control for 
whether a state is part of a carbon cap-and-trade system such as the one in California or the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern states whose compliance period 
began in 2009.  
Johnson (2014) estimates the implicit cost of carbon abatement due to RPS policies. He performs 
a two-stage regression in which the first stage estimates how renewable electricity prices (system 
marginal prices + REC prices) are affected by RPS requirements, and the second stage estimates 
how renewable capacity responds to renewable electricity prices. He concludes that the cost of 
abatement via an RPS is at least $11/ton and possibly at high as $160/ton, which he points out is 
well above the prices of carbon permits in RGGI, where were around $3.00/ton in 2009.  
Johnson and Novacheck (2015b) estimate the implicit cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
via the RPS using a detailed simulation model of unit dispatch in Michigan. They find that it is 
between $28 and $34 per ton of CO2 without government subsidies (Johnson and Novacheck, 
2015b), which is with the range of estimates from Johnson (2014). However, the effectiveness of 
an RPS in mitigating carbon emissions is significantly reduced if existing coal plants are forced 
to retire early, as could happen due to the EPA’s Clean Power Plan (Johnson and Novacheck, 
2015c). 
5. Political Opposition and the Future of RPSs 
As discussed above, the passage of RPS policies has tended to be a partisan affair, supported by 
Democrats and opposed by Republicans. Utilities have also entered the political battle on 
occasion, sometimes using artificial grassroots lobbying groups, known as “astroturf groups” or 
simply front groups, to try and block RPS proposals.
6
 Since 2014, conservatives have been 
organizing attacks on existing RPS laws in an attempt to weaken or repeal them altogether.
7
 In 
particular, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative policy shop, has 
crafted model legislation to repeal RPS requirements, and distributed its proposed bill to 
sympathetic state legislators around the country. Advertising to repeal RPSs has been funded by 
Americans for Prosperity, a group funded by the Koch brothers, who hold some of the biggest 
investments in fossil fuels in the U.S. and Canada.
8
 The anti-RPS bills were introduced in 
Arizona, Colorado, Ohio, New Mexico and New Hampshire in 2014, but none passed.  
                                                          
6
 http://energy.umich.edu/news-events/news/2015/09/01/umeis-tom-lyon-front-groups-play-growing-and-dangerous-
role-energy 
7
 Stokes (2013) reports that Ontario’s feed-in tariffs have also been experiencing political attacks. 
8
 http://americansforprosperity.org/kansas/article/americans-for-prosperity-launches-statewide-tv-radio-to-repeal-
rps/ 
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Ohio imposed a two-year “freeze” on its 2008 RPS requirement in 2014, and created a 
committee to study the impact of the RPS and recommend whether to repeal it. RPS opponents 
crowed that West Virginia had become the first state to actually repeal its RPS in early 2015.
9
 In 
reality, however, the state’s 2009 law was never really a renewable portfolio standard since it 
counted as “alternative energy” a wide range of sources that included natural gas, “clean coal,” 
and incinerated tires.  
Many of the opinion pieces promoting RPS repeal rely on studies produced by Utah State 
University’s Institute for Political Economy (IPE).10 The IPE studies rely on simplistic models 
that blame RPSs passed just before the financial crisis of 2008 for the economic damage that 
followed the financial crisis (Simmons, et al., 2015). Although the research conflates the impacts 
of RPSs with those of the financial crisis, and is hence unreliable, the reports have been 
completed for Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio, and have provided useful 
ammunition for conservative activists aiming to repeal RPS policies. The IPE is not transparent 
about its funding sources, but acknowledges that some funding comes from the Charles Koch 
Charitable Foundation, suggesting that oil and gas interests are threatened by RPSs  –-which is 
consistent with the empirical literature mentioned above.  
As of this writing, the effort to repeal RPS policies has gotten the most traction in states that 
either never had a real RPS or were among the last to adopt one. It remains an open question as 
to how far this political battle will ultimately go. 
6. Conclusions and Needs for Future Research 
Renewable Portfolio Standards are a key policy measure used by U.S. states to increase their 
production of renewable electricity. Economic theory shows that they are not first-best policy 
measures for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions or solving other environmental problems. 
Nevertheless, they have been politically popular, in part because states hope they will help create 
new jobs in what they expect will be a growth industry. The evidence suggests that on balance 
RPSs are supported by Democratic legislatures in states with good solar and wind potential, are 
more likely in states with restructured electricity markets, and are less likely in states heavily 
dependent upon natural gas for electricity generation. The evidence also suggests that these 
policies have been successful at increasing renewable generation capacity, and have increased 
the cost of electricity modestly where they have been implemented. Viewed as a carbon 
mitigation strategy, an RPS appears to reduce emissions at a cost that is roughly consistent with 
estimates of the social cost of carbon, suggesting that it is not a terribly inefficient policy, 
although it is only second-best. 
Although there is a substantial literature on RPSs, many questions remain. From a 
methodological perspective, impacts research must go beyond simply treating all RPSs as the 
same, and needs to account for the nuances of different RPS policies, as recent work has begun 
                                                          
9
 http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20150205/wva-new-gop-majority-defangs-renewable-energy-law-never-had-
bite 
10
 See, for example, http://www.cincinnati.com/story/opinion/2015/07/08/opinion-repeal-renewable-energy-
mandates/29876271/ 
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to do. More fundamentally, analyses of the effects of RPSs should account for the fact that RPS 
adoption is not imposed exogenously from afar, but is chosen through the political process. The 
endogeneity of RPSs has not been reflected in most studies of their impacts, and is an important 
area for future work.  
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been relatively little empirical analysis of the environmental 
benefits of RPS policies. To produce reliable results, of course, econometric studies of this sort 
will need to address the challenges mentioned above. Engineering-economic analyses of system 
dispatch are an underutilized but promising alternative approach. 
Political economic research has shown that RPS policies are strongly driven by political ideology 
at the state level, as well as interest-group pressures. Thus, it should not be surprising that RPSs 
may face political attacks when state politics change, or when fossil fuel interest groups grow 
more threatened. Given the political pushback that RPS policies are receiving of late, this type of 
policy should be an excellent testbed for studying the role of ideology and interest-group politics 
in influencing public policy.  
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Figure 1:  The Adoption of RPS: 1994-2015 
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Note: Iowa adopted its RPS in 1983. No states have adopted an RPS since 2008. 
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Figure 2: RPS Requirements in the US as of 2015
 
 
 
